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| Lifted out of poverty in Guangdong |
Monday, 13 August 2012
Thursday, 9 August 2012
Indulgence craved
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| Early carbon offset trading |
Well, actually, that is a gross over-simplification. It was all much more complicated:
To facilitate explanation, it may be well to state what an indulgence is not. It is not a permission to commit sin, nor a pardon of future sin; neither could be granted by any power. It is not the forgiveness of the guilt of sin; it supposes that the sin has already been forgiven. It is not an exemption from any law or duty, and much less from the obligation consequent on certain kinds of sin, e.g., restitution; on the contrary, it means a more complete payment of the debt which the sinner owes to God. It does not confer immunity from temptation or remove the possibility of subsequent lapses into sin. Least of all is an indulgence the purchase of a pardon which secures the buyer’s salvation or releases the soul of another from Purgatory. The absurdity of such notions must be obvious to any one who forms a correct idea of what the Catholic Church really teaches on this subject.
Yet some, at the time, thought rather differently, and that the result was to promote vice rather than virtue.
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| Luther thinking differently |
In 1567, Pope Pius V cancelled all grants of indulgences involving any fees or other financial transactions, but indulgences continued to be a matter exercising the minds of the Church:
After the Council of Trent, Clement VIII established a commission of Cardinals to deal with indulgences according to the mind of the Council. It continued its work during the pontificate of Paul V and published various bulls and decrees on the matter. But only Clement IX established a true Congregation of Indulgences (and Relics) with a Brief of 6 July 1669. In a motu proprio on 28 January 1904, Pius X joined the Congregation of Indulgences with that of Rites, but with the restructuring of the Roman Curia in 1908 all matters regarding indulgences was assigned to the Holy Office. In a motu proprio on 25 March 1915, Benedict XV transferred the Holy Office's Section for Indulgences to the Apostolic Penitentiary, but maintained the Holy Office's responsibility for matters regarding the doctrine of indulgences.
By the bull Indulgentiarum doctrina of 1 January 1967, Pope Paul VI, responding to suggestions made at the Second Vatican Council, substantially revised the practical application of the traditional doctrine.
Environmental protection is the new virtue and we are in the process of erecting a new Church and complicated ecclesiatical mechanisms to protect it. But, in our society, someone owns everything, including the environment, and so our mechanisms must, once again, have a monetary aspect.
It was long ago decided that someone owned the land. 'Naturally' someone must own the water the air and everything else around us.
As George Monbiot tells us, our last government, at a cost of £100,000, 'commissioned a research company to produce a total annual price for England's ecosystems. After taking the money, the company reported – with a certain understatement – that this exercise was "theoretically challenging to complete, and considered by some not to be a theoretically sound endeavour". Some of the services provided by England's ecosystems, it pointed out, "may in fact be infinite in value".
'This rare flash of common sense did nothing to discourage the current government from seeking first to put a price on nature, then to create a market in its disposal. The UK now has a natural capital committee, an Ecosystem Markets Task Force and an inspiring new lexicon. We don't call it nature any more: now the proper term is "natural capital". Natural processes have become "ecosystem services", as they exist only to serve us. Hills, forests and river catchments are now "green infrastructure", while biodiversity and habitats are "asset classes" within an "ecosystem market". All of them will be assigned a price, all of them will become exchangeable.
'But it doesn't end there. Once a resource has been commodified, speculators and traders step in. The Ecosystem Markets Task Force now talks of "harnessing City financial expertise to assess the ways that these blended revenue streams and securitisations enhance the ROI [return on investment] of an environmental bond".'
Language school
The Royal Jordanian Air Academy or RJAA was established in 1966 with its main campus in Amman, the capital city of Jordan with a satellite campus in Aqaba. The Academy is considered to be one of the leading aviation training centres in the Middle East and it trains both private and commercial pilots as well as maintenance technicians. RJAA is privately owned ...
RJAA's major shareholder and Chairman, Mohammed Abu Ghazaleh, originally from Palestine, now lives in San Francisco. Arabian Business magazine considers him to be one of the world's most influential Arabs. His net worth in 2011 was $2.4 billion and, rather surprisingly, he is the Chairman and CEO of Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc., purveyors of bananas and pineapples among many other things.
Now you ask, what does this have to do with anything?
Well, it seems that American taxpayers will be forking over hundreds of millions of dollars to one of Mr. Abu Ghazaleh's enterprises, the aforementioned Royal Jordanian Air Academy. According to a release posted here on the U.S. Department of Defense website, the U.S. Air Force has awarded RJAA a firm, fixed-price contract to provide Type 1 Special English language and technical aviation training for Iraqi Air Force technical personnel between now and August 8, 2013. The total amount of the contract - $370,779,589 for the year, which works out to $1.02 million per day. Note that this contract is not for pilot training, just for English language and technical learning.
Acknowledgements to Viable Opposition
And, for more on bananas, see:
http://richlist.arabianbusiness.com/profile/1338/
http://badbananas.wordpress.com/tag/mohammad-abu-ghazaleh/
http://www.phillyrecord.com/2011/01/fresh-del-monte-a-tough-competitor-in-a-cut-throat-trade/
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3336.htm
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/01/03/news_pf/Columns/Another_suspect_deal_.shtml
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/04/28/341728/index.htm
http://www.secform4.com/insider-trading/1418036.htm
RJAA's major shareholder and Chairman, Mohammed Abu Ghazaleh, originally from Palestine, now lives in San Francisco. Arabian Business magazine considers him to be one of the world's most influential Arabs. His net worth in 2011 was $2.4 billion and, rather surprisingly, he is the Chairman and CEO of Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc., purveyors of bananas and pineapples among many other things.
Now you ask, what does this have to do with anything?
Well, it seems that American taxpayers will be forking over hundreds of millions of dollars to one of Mr. Abu Ghazaleh's enterprises, the aforementioned Royal Jordanian Air Academy. According to a release posted here on the U.S. Department of Defense website, the U.S. Air Force has awarded RJAA a firm, fixed-price contract to provide Type 1 Special English language and technical aviation training for Iraqi Air Force technical personnel between now and August 8, 2013. The total amount of the contract - $370,779,589 for the year, which works out to $1.02 million per day. Note that this contract is not for pilot training, just for English language and technical learning.
Acknowledgements to Viable Opposition
And, for more on bananas, see:
http://richlist.arabianbusiness.com/profile/1338/
http://badbananas.wordpress.com/tag/mohammad-abu-ghazaleh/
http://www.phillyrecord.com/2011/01/fresh-del-monte-a-tough-competitor-in-a-cut-throat-trade/
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3336.htm
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/01/03/news_pf/Columns/Another_suspect_deal_.shtml
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/04/28/341728/index.htm
http://www.secform4.com/insider-trading/1418036.htm
A few bad apples
Some banks appeared unwilling to turn away, or exit, very profitable business relationships when there appeared to be an unacceptable risk of handling the proceeds of crime. Around a third of banks, including the private banking arms of some major banking groups, appeared willing to accept very high levels of money-laundering risk if the immediate reputational and regulatory risk was acceptable.
Over half the banks we visited failed to apply meaningful enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures in higher risk situations and therefore failed to identify or record adverse information about the customer or the customer’s beneficial owner. Around a third of them dismissed serious allegations about their customers without adequate review.
More than a third of banks visited failed to put in place effective measures to identify customers as PEPs. [Politically Exposed Persons] Some banks exclusively relied on commercial PEPs databases, even when there were doubts about their effectiveness or coverage. Some small banks unrealistically claimed their relationship managers (RMs) or overseas offices knew all PEPs in the countries they dealt with. And, in some cases, banks failed to identify customers as PEPs even when it was obvious from the information they held that individuals were holding or had held senior public positions.
Three quarters of the banks in our sample failed to take adequate measures to establish the legitimacy of the source of wealth and source of funds to be used in the business relationship. This was of concern in particular where the bank was aware of significant adverse information about the customer’s or beneficial owner’s integrity.
Some banks’ AML [Anti Money Laundering] risk-assessment frameworks were not robust. For example, we found evidence of risk matrices allocating inappropriate low-risk scores to high-risk jurisdictions where the bank maintained significant business relationships. This could have led to them not having to apply EDD and monitoring measures.
Some banks had inadequate safeguards in place to mitigate RMs’ conflicts of interest. At more than a quarter of banks visited, RMs appeared to be too close to the customer to take an objective view of the business relationship and many were primarily rewarded on the basis of profit and new business, regardless of their AML performance.
At a third of banks visited, the management of customer due diligence records was inadequate and some banks were unable to give us an overview of their high-risk or PEP relationships easily. This seriously impeded these banks’ ability to assess money laundering risk on a continuing basis. Nearly half the banks in our sample failed to review high-risk or PEP relationships regularly. Relevant review forms often contained recycled information year after year, indicating that these banks may not have been taking their obligation to conduct enhanced monitoring of PEP relationships seriously enough.
At a few banks, the general AML culture was a concern, with senior management and/or compliance challenging us about the whole point of the AML regime or the need to identify PEPs. ... continues
Over half the banks we visited failed to apply meaningful enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures in higher risk situations and therefore failed to identify or record adverse information about the customer or the customer’s beneficial owner. Around a third of them dismissed serious allegations about their customers without adequate review.
More than a third of banks visited failed to put in place effective measures to identify customers as PEPs. [Politically Exposed Persons] Some banks exclusively relied on commercial PEPs databases, even when there were doubts about their effectiveness or coverage. Some small banks unrealistically claimed their relationship managers (RMs) or overseas offices knew all PEPs in the countries they dealt with. And, in some cases, banks failed to identify customers as PEPs even when it was obvious from the information they held that individuals were holding or had held senior public positions.
Three quarters of the banks in our sample failed to take adequate measures to establish the legitimacy of the source of wealth and source of funds to be used in the business relationship. This was of concern in particular where the bank was aware of significant adverse information about the customer’s or beneficial owner’s integrity.
Some banks’ AML [Anti Money Laundering] risk-assessment frameworks were not robust. For example, we found evidence of risk matrices allocating inappropriate low-risk scores to high-risk jurisdictions where the bank maintained significant business relationships. This could have led to them not having to apply EDD and monitoring measures.
Some banks had inadequate safeguards in place to mitigate RMs’ conflicts of interest. At more than a quarter of banks visited, RMs appeared to be too close to the customer to take an objective view of the business relationship and many were primarily rewarded on the basis of profit and new business, regardless of their AML performance.
At a third of banks visited, the management of customer due diligence records was inadequate and some banks were unable to give us an overview of their high-risk or PEP relationships easily. This seriously impeded these banks’ ability to assess money laundering risk on a continuing basis. Nearly half the banks in our sample failed to review high-risk or PEP relationships regularly. Relevant review forms often contained recycled information year after year, indicating that these banks may not have been taking their obligation to conduct enhanced monitoring of PEP relationships seriously enough.
At a few banks, the general AML culture was a concern, with senior management and/or compliance challenging us about the whole point of the AML regime or the need to identify PEPs. ... continues
Tuesday, 7 August 2012
What standards? What charter?
"Simply the best, better than all the rest," was one analyst's verdict on Standard Chartered last week, reflecting the sense that the bank is different from any other listed in London.
Apparently it is all the fault of a 'rogue regulator'. Maybe so, but from Wikipedia:
The Shanghai branch of Chartered bank began operation in August 1858. Initially, the bank's business dealt specifically with large volume discounting and re-discounting of opium and cotton bills. Although there was a gradual rise in opium cultivation in China, the imports of opium still increased from 50,087 picul in 1863 to 82,61 picul by 1888. Transactions in the opium trade generated substantial profits for Chartered bank.
In 1992, scandal broke when banking regulators charged several employees of Standard Chartered in Mumbai with illegally diverting depositors’ funds to speculate in the stock market. Fines by Indian regulators and provisions for losses cost the bank almost 350 million pounds, a third of its capital.
Scandal erupted again in 1994, when the Sunday Times of London wrote that an executive in the bank’s metals-trading arm had bribed officials in Malaysia and the Philippines in order to win business. The bank, in a statement on 18 July 1994, said there were “discrepancies in expense claims” that “included gifts to individuals in certain countries to facilitate business, a practice contrary to bank rules.'
In 1997, Standard Chartered sold its metals trading arm to Toronto-based Scotiabank for US$26 million. In 1994, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission found that Standard Chartered’s Asian investment bank had illegally helped to artificially support the price of new shares they had underwritten for six companies from July 1991 to March 1993. The bank admitted the offense, apologized and reorganized its brokerage units. The commission banned the bank from underwriting IPOs in Hong Kong for nine months. Standard Chartered’s Asian investment banking operations never recovered, and in 2000 the bank closed them down.
The bank fully recovered in late '90s, during this time, the bank sold off holdings in continental Europe and the Americas, sold the headquarters building (lease-back) and branch properties in Hong Kong. In 2000, Standard Chartered acquired Grindlays Bank & Chase Manhattan Bank Hong Kong retail banking business. The ethics issues and financial losses triggered turmoil in Standard Chartered’s London executive suite. The bank went through three CEOs in three years: Malcolm Williamson was replaced in 1998 by Rana Talwar, who was in turn unseated by Mervyn Davies in 2001. By the time Davies took over, his predecessors had systematically sold off the bank’s holdings in continental Europe and the Americas.
Apparently it is all the fault of a 'rogue regulator'. Maybe so, but from Wikipedia:
The Shanghai branch of Chartered bank began operation in August 1858. Initially, the bank's business dealt specifically with large volume discounting and re-discounting of opium and cotton bills. Although there was a gradual rise in opium cultivation in China, the imports of opium still increased from 50,087 picul in 1863 to 82,61 picul by 1888. Transactions in the opium trade generated substantial profits for Chartered bank.
In 1992, scandal broke when banking regulators charged several employees of Standard Chartered in Mumbai with illegally diverting depositors’ funds to speculate in the stock market. Fines by Indian regulators and provisions for losses cost the bank almost 350 million pounds, a third of its capital.
Scandal erupted again in 1994, when the Sunday Times of London wrote that an executive in the bank’s metals-trading arm had bribed officials in Malaysia and the Philippines in order to win business. The bank, in a statement on 18 July 1994, said there were “discrepancies in expense claims” that “included gifts to individuals in certain countries to facilitate business, a practice contrary to bank rules.'
In 1997, Standard Chartered sold its metals trading arm to Toronto-based Scotiabank for US$26 million. In 1994, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission found that Standard Chartered’s Asian investment bank had illegally helped to artificially support the price of new shares they had underwritten for six companies from July 1991 to March 1993. The bank admitted the offense, apologized and reorganized its brokerage units. The commission banned the bank from underwriting IPOs in Hong Kong for nine months. Standard Chartered’s Asian investment banking operations never recovered, and in 2000 the bank closed them down.
The bank fully recovered in late '90s, during this time, the bank sold off holdings in continental Europe and the Americas, sold the headquarters building (lease-back) and branch properties in Hong Kong. In 2000, Standard Chartered acquired Grindlays Bank & Chase Manhattan Bank Hong Kong retail banking business. The ethics issues and financial losses triggered turmoil in Standard Chartered’s London executive suite. The bank went through three CEOs in three years: Malcolm Williamson was replaced in 1998 by Rana Talwar, who was in turn unseated by Mervyn Davies in 2001. By the time Davies took over, his predecessors had systematically sold off the bank’s holdings in continental Europe and the Americas.
Monday, 6 August 2012
Evidence base
"I've got no scientific evidence for this at all, but I think it really does make a difference."
"There is no accurate assessment of the figures on this..."
Tony Blair, justifying the £9million (or whatever) cost of the London Olympics.
Perhaps he's right, but how starkly it contrasts with the evidence-based, payment-by-results rhetoric and approach of most modern government in this country.
But of course there is no reason to look for consistency in the way our world is organised. We - 'ordinary' people and policians alike - focus on and celebrate the individual triumphs of athletes in these games whose organisation and presentation is dominated by big government, big organisation and big commerce. At least the opening ceremony wasn't outsourced to G4S by competitive tender or produced by a government task force.
"There is no accurate assessment of the figures on this..."
Tony Blair, justifying the £9million (or whatever) cost of the London Olympics.
Perhaps he's right, but how starkly it contrasts with the evidence-based, payment-by-results rhetoric and approach of most modern government in this country.
But of course there is no reason to look for consistency in the way our world is organised. We - 'ordinary' people and policians alike - focus on and celebrate the individual triumphs of athletes in these games whose organisation and presentation is dominated by big government, big organisation and big commerce. At least the opening ceremony wasn't outsourced to G4S by competitive tender or produced by a government task force.
Public accountability - according to Maude
Explaining the impact of the change, Maude said: "People feel accountable to those people whose views make a difference to their future careers, and if the views of ministers are not being sought – and in my own department they were not – then there is not a very clear sense of where the accountability of civil servants seems to lie."
Maude said coalition ministers were enraged by the way some civil servants mounted passive resistance by declining to challenge government policy but refusing to implement it. He has described the practice as too widespread and a "sin against the holy ghost".
Maude said coalition ministers were enraged by the way some civil servants mounted passive resistance by declining to challenge government policy but refusing to implement it. He has described the practice as too widespread and a "sin against the holy ghost".
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